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INTRODUCTION:
DEREGULATION,
COMPETITION, AND THE
REGIONAL BELLS
A "natural monopoly" is normally
subject to maximum rate regulation.'
Such a monopoly exists when economies
of scale for a single physical plant
structure exist across the full range of2
expected demand for that structure.
Such a structure usually involves high
initial fixed costs, as with a railroad or
power utility. In other words, there is
room for only one enterprise to operate
efficiently. It is uneconomic to repeat
rights of way, tracks, or lines where a
single system accommodates all of the
anticipated traffic.
Maximum rate regulation is imposed
by state public agencies to prevent excessive prices, and also to assure the
owners of the monopoly a fair rate of
return on their investment.3 The purpose of regulation is to substitute
for the absent marketplace. The ideal
market-which would normally allocate
resources according to consumer preference through purchasing decisions, and
improve competitive performance
through the natural selection of the most
efficient-accomplishes neither function
where a natural monopoly exists. The
regulator must somehow set fair prices
and prescribe conditions of operation to
satisfy consumer preference and stimulate efficiency improvement.
But what happens when the monopoly enterprise wishes to enter into areas
where there is competition-where there
is clearly room for more than one
entrepreneur? What happens when the
structure of the industry begins to
change so that the fixed cost structure
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becomes divisible, or perhaps usable by
several competing entities? What happens when it can be bypassed entirely to
provide the same service without reliance
on the fixed cost structure? What happens when some people are still dependent upon the fixed cost natural
monopoly, but others can avoid it,
abandon it, lower its utilization, and
raise the unit costs for those who must
continue to rely upon it? What happens
when competitors can take from the
fixed plant traffic and "skim the cream,"
thus removing the high-profit traffic
from the fixed plant monopoly enterprise?
These are basic regulatory questions.
They are not new. They have been faced,
albeit sometimes very unsuccessfully,
by the federal Interstate Commerce
Commission in its regulation of railroad rates as they interplay with water
carriage and trucking enterprises also
subject to regulation.4 And in the establishment of both power and telecommunications regulation, state public
utility commissions have confronted
monopoly/ competitive sector interaction
in a host of contexts: regulated companies dealing with affiliated (non-regulated) suppliers operating in the competitive sector;5 and protection of a natural
6
monopoly structure from competition.
But no area presents these questions
more starkly than does the continuing
technological revolution in telecommunications. Cable television regulation by
state and local authorities involves local
companies often given effective monopoly franchises, with extremely crude
and scandalously deficient arrangements
for rate regulation. 7 Here, a new enterprise raises increasing and serious
natural monopoly questions in the control of information distribution, not
merely as to recently-addressed issues of
free speech access, 8 but in the ignored
area of rate review. 9
In our more traditional telephone
and data communication systems, we
are moving somewhat away from what
has been an overwhelming natural monopoly structure. Substitutes for some
services heretofore thought to be the
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province of pre-1984 AT&T and its subsidiaries are technologically feasible
apart from the rights of way and lines
which formed their high fixed cost
"loop". These advances are still largely
in gestation, but they do portend possible
changes for America's telecommunications industry.
The interaction of competitive business sectors with our telephone monopoly is not new, except historically it has
occurred by abuse from the monopoly
side into the competitive sector rather
than by competitive challenge to the
monopoly. AT&T has a long history of
incursion into the competitive sector
beyond the scope of its monopoly responsibility. It has used its monopoly
power to eliminate competition in areas
of non-monopoly enterprise in which it
was involved. 10 For example, consumer
phone equipment may be manufactured
by any number of entities, and the activities of then-AT&T regional phone subsidiaries in prohibiting connection to
their loops of any equipment except that
manufactured by its own subsidiary or
affiliated companies have been documented in antitrust litigation over the
past two decades. And there are other
abuses one might expect, given the verity
of Lord Acton's sage dictum that "power
corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely."
There proved to be a check on the
abuses of AT&T: the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department of Justice." In
ordering the divestiture of AT&T and
the break-up of the Bell operating systems into separate regional companies,
Judge Greene in United States v. A T& T
dramatically reshaped the industry. The
concept was not complex: structurally
inhibit monopoly power abuse; allow
competition where new technology
moots the natural monopoly structure;
and confine the monopoly to its minimum territory. The brunt of the monopoly power was left with the spin-off
independent regional Bell companies.
They control the high fixed cost "loop"
of rights of way and lines upon which
most of us still rely for our telephone
service.12 The generic name for the pro-

0
viders of this local loop (the Regional
Bells and other small providers which
exist outside the previous AT&T structure) is "local exchange carriers," or-in
the jargon of telecommunications-LECs.
Now, with the devolution of these
LECs, we are left with a new version of
old questions, except the interaction is
two-sided. New technology may challenge these local monopolies, injuring
the monopoly power structure upon
which essential services still depend.
And the local Bells are anxious not only
to meet any such challenge, but to
expand into areas of commerce clearly
subject to competition and which do not
necessarily require any natural monopoly connection.
Some of the parameters of LEC entry
into competitive sectors will be set by
Judge Greene as he refines his U.S. v.
AT&T order, but in the long run they
are likely to depend more substantially
on regulation by state public utility commissions, which now have what is for
many of them a newly complex problem:
what to do about the proclivities of
these LECs to use their still-existing
monopoly power structure for advantage
in the competitive sector?
This question is a great deal more
difficult than the traditional maximum
rate regulation questions, such as the
definition and calculation of proper rate
base, prudent expenditures, anticipated
revenue, and fair rate of return at a
sensible debt/equity ratio on invested
capital. Now we have additional variables: antitrust concepts and concerns;
issues of cross-subsidy; protection of the
monopoly fixed plant from underutilization; and others.
Moreover, we have regional Bells and
other LECs singing a consistent song: if
competitors are going to challenge us,
let us challenge them. The LECs insist
that a new day is already upon us-that
their monopoly power system is being
bypassed by new technological challenge;
and that COMSAT, microwave relays,
and private fiber-optic networks are
skimming the cream off their high-profit
commercial data and other traffic. They
argue that in this era of "deregulation,"
they should by deregulated as well, and
should further be allowed "rate flexibility"--that is, the right to lower rates
for specific customers to retain high and
efficient traffic levels where those customers are presented with competitive
alternatives. They want to invest heavily
in modernization to maintain that same
traffic or to attract new traffic. That
modernization will provide services
already or prospectively available from
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competitive sector sources. The LECs
3
seek latitude to compete.'
An examination of these issues is
now underway in California as applied
to Pacific Bell (PacBell), the regional
Bell LEC subsidiary of Pacific Telesis.
As part of its initial post-divestiture rate
review, the California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC), to its credit, has
entertained a separate yearlong phase
on questions of PacBell's modernization,
14
utilization and productivity (MUP).
Growing from this proceeding (which is
still ongoing) is a November 25, 1987
order of the Commission to consider en
banc PacBell's request for "pricing
flexibility" for services subject to competition, and certain other related
questions. 15
The Center for Public Interest Law
(CPIL) has participated in these hearings
and has had the opportunity to conduct
regression studies on the cost and traffic
features of the PacBell physical plant as
it is evolving. CPIL has also had the
opportunity to engage in substantial discovery into PacBell operating documents
and internal memoranda. CPIL has offered its own hearing testimony and exhibits, and has cross-examined at some
length those experts provided by PacBell.
These proceedings serve as a useful
forum to examine the basic regulatory
issues, precedents, and policy alternatives applicable to the regional Bell
companies and other LECs.
Based on that examination, and on
the information currently available from
which regulatory decisions are made,
CPIL has proposed the formal adoption
of a required Economic Impact Statement (EIS), which must be filed by a
regional Bell LEC before committing
itself to a major modernization investment program. Completion of the EIS
would provide a clear structure, consonant with sound regulatory policy, for
the proper evaluation of such ventures.
And its principles are applicable not
only to modernization expenditures to
increase traffic, but also to LEC-proposed "rate flexibility" plans, where rate
reductions toward out-of-pocket costs
(and without overhead contribution) are
proposed for a particular group of customers to meet competition.
PACBELL'S MODERNIZATION
PLANS AND CRITERIA
During 1986, PacBell spent some $2
billion for new construction. 16 Expenditures for both growth and modernization
will consume many millions of dollars
in additional rate base funds, upon
which a rate of return or debt interest

payments will be assessed from ratepayers. Over the past decade, much of
this "modernization" has involved the
replacement of existing switching facilities with more advanced electronic technology. 17 Much of this aspect of
PacBell's modernization program has
been completed, 18 and PacBell now proposes to enter into a "market need
concept," with emphasis on profitability. 19 The electronic switching modernization was justified under a "CUCRIT"
formula (discussed infra) where direct
cost advantages in comparison with existing equipment 20allegedly justified the
investment made.
The utility now proposes, often under
the misnomer of "revenue factors," to
advance a modernization program with
implications far beyond switch upgrading justified by lower maintenance costs.
The LECs are now advancing fiber-optic
technology. 2' The alteration of basic
transmission equipment has implications
beyond a simple "the maintenance cost
savings pay for this improvement" kind
of calculation. More important, the
LECS are now proposing major ventures
into areas subject to unregulated competition, from alarm services to modular
22
phones to data transmission services.
And the LECs are focusing system
changes in areas where they believe bypass threatens loss of business.23 Further, they are entering directly into the
offering of products and services avail24
able from competitive sector sources.
PacBell (as with regional Bell LECs
generally) has confined modernization
criteria substantially to the use of its
CUCRIT formula. This formula calculates the net present value of alternative
technology or equipment strategies based
on discounted cash flows. 25 It purports
to calculate whether or not a "modernization" investment is more cost-effective
than present equipment or alternative
proposals. The value of such a calculation is undeniable.
But PacBell is interested in directing
its modernization efforts not merely
where more efficient equipment can do
the same task more cheaply, but in areas
where it can offer new services altogether, particularly where competition threatens the loss of existing customers. 26 In
PacBell testimony during current PUC
rate hearings, witnesses consistently
stressed a need to return to market concepts to maintain the satisfaction of
long-term existing customers. 27 PacBell's
expert witness Sullivan contended that
PacBell had specific areas "vulnerable
to competition. 2 8 PacBell witness Bandler testified that "modernization is the
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orderly integration of new technology,"
and that the post-divestiture environment requires "flexibility" and a "profit
orientation." 29 PacBell witness Whittiker
testified that the utility must achieve
economic growth and evolution.30 And,
with particular candor, PacBell witness
Copeland testified that the purpose of
modernization should be to maximize
the pool of money available for distribution by the utility,3 ' and in testimony
defended this 32rationale as sufficient,
standing alone.
PacBell leaps from its CUCRIT history into broader arenas by citing "revenue factors" which vaguely must be
taken into account.3 3 They are to be
examined by unannounced
criteria on a
"case by case" basis. 3 4
MISSING MODERNIZATION
CRITERIA
LECs cannot justify major modernization decisions in the new environment
based on a CUCRIT formula standing
alone, or supplemented by "revenue factors" based upon the need to stem traffic
loss because competitors take traffic
from their fixed cost plant or "loop."
The new environment faced by the LECs
makes the introduction of other relevant
considerations essential. These additional factors perhaps understandably are
not considered by a utility which has
never previously dealt this substantially
in the competitive sector, and which
continues to operate by examining internal cost efficiencies and external
factors affecting growth. Where growth
is not a function of mere "forecasting,"
but may be a dynamic interaction between the LECs' cost advantages and
those cost advantages of companies
operating in the competitive sector, the
criteria relied upon before advancing
risk capital must be much different. We
now do not have the mere task of forecasting population and use growth or
decline. We now have the possibility of
substantial changes in utilization levels
for fixed plant. We now have a PacBell
modernization commitment which will
bring a counter-stroke by those in the
competitive sector. Based on the state of
the record in the MUP phase of the
PacBell rate proceeding before the California PUC, these prospects are not
35
familiar concepts to LEC managers.
Apart from the utility, the regulator
has additional responsibilities to calculate whether or not the utility should
enter into a sector otherwise served by
competitive forces, to measure the effect
of such entry on the structure it regulates (particularly the monopoly power

The California Regulatory Law Reporter

portion where its stewardship remains),
and to measure cross-subsidies both
within the utility between competitive
and noncompetitive areas, and between
the utility and those outside forces contending with it.
Utilization and Economy
of Scale Analysis
As an LEC, PacBell remains a high
fixed cost enterprise, subject to increasing competition for some of its business,
while retaining monopoly power for the
brunt of it.36 As a general matter, higher utilization of its network lowers average costs, promoting affordable rates
and universal service, and can also mean
avoidance of duplicative investment.
It is theoretically possible for competitors to remove traffic from the fixed
plant portion of PacBell ("bypass'). It is
also possible that the fixed plant cannot
be "stepped down" or reduced in size to
accommodate that lower flow at high
utilization levels. Where that decline in
traffic lowers the utilization of fixed
plant, revenue requirements per unit of
traffic increase. Unit costs go up if the
same plant handles less traffic. This loss
is particularly important if it affects
high-profit traffic already cross-subsidizing those who have no alternative but
PacBell services. Hence, PacBell's theoretical argument that "universal service"
is threatened may have merit if those
conditions giving rise to the danger
37
exist.
In its Notice of En Banc Hearing to
consider modernization criteria, the PUC
acknowledged the relevance of utilization analysis, but fell into a conceptual
trap in assuming that: "[f]ull network
utilization has two components: (1) retaining and expanding the customer base
for existing services and (2) adding new
39
services. '"38 In fact, full utilization of
the local network and accompanying
lower average costs are not directly or
necessarily dependent on either retaining
existing customers, or expanding customers, or adding new services.
To assume that maximizing each of
these factors necessarily leads to lower
average costs presumes that the local
exchange network is everywhere operating below its optimum, and therefore all
customers should be retained and more
traffic added. There is no data to support this thesis and much to refute it.
Particularly as it assumes that growth is
always preferred, the theory is on decidedly thin ice, and the regulator should
be wary of going very far with it.
The LECs routinely assume that there
are essentially infinite economies of scale
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and that increased efficiencies are always
possible through the capture or retention
of maximum traffic. For example, they
routinely assume that more net access
lines (NALs) yield greater overall efficiencies. Thus, PacBell's efficiency measures traditionally rely on figures derived
from NALs. However, and as admitted
by PacBell's expert economic witness
Dr. Lewis J. Perl, 40 it is a well-known
axiom of economics that very large enterprises often reach a point of diseconomy
of scale. That is, they achieve maximum
efficiency at a given size, and further
traffic addition requires capital or other
cost commitments which raise the unit
cost of providing service. Hence, additional traffic can increase average costs for
all customers and diminish overall plant
efficiency.
It is critical that the regulator not
assume that the LECs have infinitely
increasing economies of scale. As a
simple illustration, if a major sunk-cost
facility serving a stable market is already
operating at 95% utilization, it may be
very unwise to permit expansion of new
services in that area, in order to generate
10% more traffic, if that will necessitate
major new capital expenditures for core
services. These costs would be over and
above those directly related to the new
services, and would be borne by all ratepayers, yielding a net increase in average
costs. This same caveat exists in allowing the LECs to lower rates to marginal
cost (that is, out-of-pocket costs) to keep
traffic or attract new traffic when the
result may be required capacity (plant)
expansion costing a great deal more than
the low rates charged for that traffic.
This concern for both rate lowering or
modernization commitment to keep or
enhance traffic is especially appropriate,
since both rate breaks and modernization are generally directed at various
kinds of business traffic-and the surge
of business traffic from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. is what compels the capacity
levels
41
of current plant in the first place.
The generally correct statement in
the Notice that "higher levels of network
utilization lower average costs" goes
astray with the apparent corollary that
expanding the customer base and adding new services are necessary components. That analysis "assumes only
straight line total cost curves, a highly
unlikely possibility. ' '42 Therefore, while
it may be true as a general matter that
increasing levels of traffic may lead to
increased levels of utilization which may
lead to lower overall average costs, the
regulator should not adopt that syllogism uncritically in every case. When-
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ever an LEC refers to utilization levels
to justify capital expenditures (or selectively lower rates), either to retain existing customers or to expand the customer
base or products, the regulator must
examine the underlying thesis with extreme care to be certain the data justify
the assumptions.
CPIL has performed a rudimentary
study of PacBell's economies of scale, in
order to preliminarily test the assumption that "expanding the customer base"
and "adding new services" are linked to
43
decreasing average costs.
The genesis for the study is a simple
set of facts. Since 1970, PacBell has
more than doubled in size. If it is true
that economies of scale exist, then the
increased size should reveal that average
costs are declining as more traffic is
handled. The questions are obvious: as
the number of NALs double, what happens to normalized average costs per
line? Per CCS message unit (a measure
of line wage)? Per number nine toll call?
When the plant handles twice as many
CCS message units, does the average
cost of CCS message units, adjusted for
inflation, decline? What is the case for
toll calls?
CPIL's study has been hotly disputed
by PacBell, which would prefer it be
discarded. CPIL has never pretended its
study is definitive or comprehensive; it
could not be, since only PacBell has the
data and wherewithal to perform complete economy of scale studies. However, two factors from the CPIL study
stand out: (1) a large LEC such as
PacBell may already be close to an
optimum size such that little if any further decreases in average cost can be
anticipated from further growth;" and
(2) PacBell has steadfastly refused to do
even preliminary work to determine its
economies of scale in its own plant,
either as a whole or as to any of its
parts relevant to its modernization
45
plans.
CPIL used data supplied entirely by
PacBell, and used PacBell's own "Telephone Plant Index" to normalize costs
for inflation. CPIL took each separate
PacBell cost factor, as well as total costs,
and ran a series of statistical computer
regressions. The results are remarkable.
There is very little reliable relationship
in the individual cost accounts as to the
unit costs at varying PacBell operational
sizes. No measure of growth compared
to costs shows any strong economy of
scale, and some may even show diseconomies of scale. In all cases, the
curve is very shallow, suggesting that
while there may be diseconomies of scale

as CCS and NALs have grown, and
some economies of scale as toll calls
have increased, the difference in unit
costs produced by increases in NALs,
CCS, and toll calls is very slight, whether higher or lower. Thus, the gross measures relied on by the LECs do not
evidence any substantial economy of
scale structure. 46 Fluctuations up or
down in total traffic simply may not
make any statistically significant difference in average costs.
This study and its results should not
be the end of this inquiry, but should
give the regulator pause before adopting
a generalized theory of growth assuming
economies of scale and necessarily leading to lower average costs overall. Before the Commission relies on that syllogism for its decisions, it should require
the LECs to collect and provide appropriate analyses of their economies of
scale.
This argument is not meant to imply
that economy of scale and utilization
analysis should assume no economies of
scale. It is possible that for a given
aspect of an LEC's plant (e.g., where
fiber-optics are being applied), there is a
major economy of scale feature. It is
also possible that the relationship between traffic and cost is curvilinear and
that, for example, diseconomies of scale
for NALs become sharply more pronounced as NALs are added. These
questions are not dispositive, but illustrate the most challenging aspect of the
study: the LECs have no idea of their
economies of scale and have conducted
47
few if any studies to determine them.
Turning from the link between
growth and average cost to the particular case of competition within the existing customer base, the threat of bypass
does not necessarily mean a decrease in
utilization or an increase in average
costs. The regulator should not assume
that fixed costs assigned to a customer
who opts to bypass the system will
necessarily stand idle following loss of
the customer.
First, of course, to the extent that
the organization has grown beyond its
optimum size, stepping back in a particular part of the plant may result in
net savings for all. Even more important,
the loss of the existing traffic from bypass may simply not register at all, due
to growth.
The astonishing continuing growth
in demand for telecommunications services-regardless of population or economic indices-belies any hard connection between bypass and absolutely
lower utilization levels. For example,

PacBell faces growing demand regardless
of competition. The loss of a particular
customer does not necessarily diminish
overall utilization; rather, it may simply
slow the rate of growth. In the revenue
requirements phase of the ongoing General Rate Case, for instance, PacBell's
witnesses identified various increasing
sources of traffic for PacBell's future
business. 48 Every one of the indices of
traffic and operational size increase
available-number of new telephones,
CCS units, NALs, and number nine toll
message units-indicate steady increase
every year, with the exception of one
measure during one year. 49 The evidence
is conclusive that regardless of some
competitive challenge, traffic continues
to increase. Thus, bypass by a given
customer, or even class of customer,
may be swallowed by the continuing
growth in other customer classes.
Accordingly, the regulator should
avoid the LECs' kneejerk reaction to
alleged customer loss. Although the
LECs may have an institutional desire
to retain every customer, the regulator
should not share that goal, and steady
traffic increases raise doubts about the
validity of a syllogism automatically
linking retention to high utilization to
lower average costs.
Despite the evident need for data on
utilization, PacBell and the other LECs
have done nothing to gather the data
they need, or to apply it to their competitive investment decisions. Even
PacBell's own econometricians acknowledge the need for utilization data. For
instance, PacBell's Perl has recently testified that with regard to the marginal
cost of additional services, "in order to
assess that you have to know whether
those costs vary depending on the scale
of the output." 50 Furthermore, he agreed
that specific utilization projections were
necessary regarding specific parts of
the plant affected by a modernization
decision 51before the investment could
be made.
Another of PacBell's experts testified
that valuation of outside plant (OSP)
utilization must be based on "incremental cost analysis and not on simplistic
analysis.... -52 Similarly, yet another
PacBell witness has argued that the
measurement of central office utilization
(COU) is not adequate. 53 Yet these two
indices of utilization (OSP and COU)
are the only indices available from
current PacBell data, are not presented
by the utility by aspect of plant affected
by an investment decision, and play no
role in rate or modernization decisions
at PacBell. Nor are they a part of
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PacBell's CUCRIT benefit-cost computer model.
The significance of utilization and
economy of scale analyses is not new to
the California PUC. The Commission
has already recognized that there are
severe problems with simply assuming
that costs are directly correlated with
growth. In Decision 86-01-026, the Commission specifically put the LECs on
notice that uncritical application of
"sizing drivers" (allowing costs to pass
through and allow more revenue based
on a percentage increase in new traffic
54
or NALs added) is a thing of the past.
At the urging of CPIL, the Commission
for the first time refused to simply
assume any straight line relationship between net access lines and costs, and
instead demanded a close analysis. "In
future rate proceedings, we expect
Pacific Bell, General and Continental to
address in their direct showings the correlation between their various sizing
drivers and incremental expense
changes." 55 In other words, if the PUC
calculates that an LEC justifiably needs
$800 million in revenue to operate in
1987, the LEC projects 10% more traffic
(or 10% more NALs) in 1988, and the
next rate proceeding is set for 1990, how
is the revenue requirement for 1988 to
be figured? LECs will propose, in an
abbreviated "attrition" proceeding, that
rates be set to yield $880 million-a
straight-line sizing driver. But if there
are economies of scale, the unit costs
should decline with additional traffic
and costs should be projected at less
than $880 million.
The California Commission has rejected the notion that there is a direct
correlation between "expanding the customer base" or "increasing traffic" and
total costs. Economies of scale must be
considered. Regulators should be careful
not to inferentially readopt, in the context of allowing modernization investment to protect unit costs, what they
have rejected in the context of traditional monopoly ratemaking.
CPIL has presented to the PUC four
threshold sub-tests of utilization which
should be considered in making a modernization investment decision. These
factors are quite beyond the CUCRIT
considerations of PacBell.5 6 These four
tests form the "utilization" element of
CPIL's proposed EIS requirement, and
should provide the basis for PacBell
justification and PUC review of a proposed modernization investment.
First, the PUC must determine that
there is in fact a natural monopoly structure appropriate for protection. If all

services deemed necessary by society can
be provided by the competitive sector,
there may be no inevitable natural mon5
opoly structure to warrant concern. 7
Clearly, such a monopoly structure exists
today as to most or all LECs.
The second test concerns the impact
of the modernization investment on utilization of existing plant. Although the
PacBell CUCRIT formula partially measures utilization of the specifically proposed modernized equipment, it does
not measure utilization impact on ancillary equipment, or on the plant as a
whole-and, as explained infra these are
critical factors. In order to determine
whether or not a system efficiency benefit will accrue from a modernization
program, one must know which aspects
of the utility plant are fixed and which
are variable (i.e., how do the costs
respond to changes in traffic), and also
the utilization levels for major fixed cost
increments.
For PacBell or another utility to consider a modernization investment, it
must make a sophisticated economy of
scale and utilization analysis. 58 Then it
must determine to what extent a proposed modernization project will affect
economies of scale and utilization levels
resulting thereafter. This analysis must
include those aspects of fixed plant connected to it and affected by it. 9
This analysis is particularly called
for as to PacBell, given the fact that the
gross unit cost numbers appear to justify, in and of themselves, no modernization campaign to maintain either NAL
or CCS levels, and only an extremely
focused and frugal modernization effort
to maintain toll call levels. Given the
fact that toll call levels have doubled
during the last eight years, it is doubtful
that a substantial argument could be
made for modernization investment to
stem bypass even here. And, as noted
above, all traffic measures have been
steadily increasing. However, the data
to support such an argument may be
available as to a particular part of
PacBell's plant, and should be marshalled if applicable.
Following this analysis, PacBell must
move to the third consideration relevant
to utilization: that of "indivisibilities."
To the extent it finds declining utilization or substantial economy of scale
structure, to what extent can fixed plant
be "stepped back" or reduced and put to
alternative use? How big are the pieces
of fixed cost increments and over what

period of time can they be adjusted to
the alterations and traffic flow in
futuro?60
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Finally, PacBell must calculate the
cost of modernization on a unit basis
vis-a-vis the savings which will occur
from the increased utilization of physical
plant. It must measure the cost savings
from increased utilization and calculate
that against the cost of modernization.
These are calculations above and beyond
those required by the CUCRIT formula,
but they are important to any modernization investment decision which does
not rely on straight out-of-pocket cost
savings justifications.
Competitive Impact and
Cross-Subsidies
.
PacBell and other regional Bells and
LECs are increasingly subject to competition. In the tradition of monopoly
enterprises, PacBell seeks to use its
market power to extend itself into areas
subject to competitive challenge. This
extension by a utility requires a measurement of the competitive environment.
At the most basic level, the utility must
look at its new venture unit costs vis-avis those of its existing or likely competitors. If the competitors can do it
more cheaply, the utility should not try
it, even if the competitors' current prices
are high enough to give the utility a
theoretical profit on its new investment
venture. Further, the regulator must be
sensitive to the cross-subsidies which
may be implicit in a new investmentincluding where certain users pay a
larger proportion of total utility fixed
plant overhead, or pay for modernization capital costs while those using
modernized facilities or services pay
only out-of-pocket costs.
Finally, the impact on outside entrepreneurs and the competitive marketplace should be evaluated. These
competitive impact concerns form a part
of the major discipline of antitrust law.
Prior and limited monopoly/ competitive
sector interaction has given rise to a
series of egregious restraints of trade by
AT&T, PacBell, and others, which have
resulted in extensive6 litigation and courtordered divestiture. '
As in the area of utilization, however, the LECs have been woefully deficient in recognizing or gathering the
most basic economic data needed to
assess the competitive impact of their
entry into new markets. In evaluating
an investment designed to compete with
existing facilities available in the market,
several steps must be considered-none
of which are part of the criteria currently
used by the LECs. The regulator must
impose upon the LECs the obligation to
assess the competitive impact of their
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investment decisions.
First, the LEC must measure the
current and potential cost structure of
its competitors. Any entrepreneur in the
marketplace seeking to venture risk
capital will begin by surveying the
market and will then evaluate the present and potential competitors capable of
offering competing cost structures.
In effect, most LECs are still bound
by the monopoly mentality. They measure only two factors in making their
modernization investment decisions:
their own internal cost factors, and external factors only as they affect growth.
They utterly ignore the competition.
They simply fail to recognize that the
environment is not a benign one which
is static; on the contrary, competitors
will react to the LEC's entry into the
market, and customers will react to both
the competitors and the LEC. In the
simplest terms, the competitors will immediately begin to drop their prices to
best the LEC. The LEC must therefore
also begin to lower its price to stay
competitive, or offer other incentives
that raise the LEC's cost to retain the
customer.
In either case, the cost and revenue
figures calculated in the vacuum are no
longer relevant. A vigorous competitive
marketplace ensures that this kind of
move and countermove will continue, as
each side drops its prices toward its
long-run marginal costs. Neither side
can long continue in the market once
the price drops below its marginal cost.
However, the LECs simply fail to assess
their competitors' cost structures to
determine whether they have an inherent
cost advantage that will necessarily result in the competitor undercutting the
LEC.62 This most basic information that
every shopkeeper needs before he opens
his doors-how low can I go and how
low can the fellow next door go-is
utterly lacking in one of the largest
companies in the state.
In addition to gathering basic competitive data, the LECs must be required
to calculate cross-subsidies. To the
extent cross-subsidies may be involved
within the LEC in order to carry the
competitive enterprise, they should be
revealed. It is possible that this crosssubsidy may take the form of low utilization levels of new modernized plant, to
be carried by lower levels of utilization
and higher average costs by existing
ratepayers. If so, the analysis urged
above as to utilization should reveal
that cross-subsidy. There may even be
subtle cross-subsidies (profitable aspects
which are carrying below-marginal-cost

ventures).
Finally, the regulator must be concerned with issues which escape the
LECs regarding the legal impact of utility intrusion into the competitive sector.
LECs are in a position to commit what
would otherwise be antitrust violations
in the marketplace. These violations
may include all or any of the following
vagaries of behavior traditional where
an entrepreneur possesses substantial
market power in one market and intrudes into another: group boycotts
(Sherman Act Section I); tie-ins (Sherman Act Section 1, Clayton Act Section
3); predatory practices (RobinsonPatman Act, Sherman Act Section 2);
and/or unfair extension of monopoly
power (Sherman Act Section 2).
The problems of deferring to a utility's unbridled discretion as it operates in
the competitive sector predate U.S. v.
A T&T, and occupy a large part of the
archives of antitrust abuse. The body of
law stretches from the 1922 Keogh v.
Chicago & N. W.R.R. case 63 to the cable
television cases recently under litigation. 64 A review of the findings of facts
in these cases, and literally thousands of
lower court progeny, should make any
regulator cautious about countenancing
monopoly entry into the competitive
sector without maximum information
and at least a modicum of prophylactic
safeguard.
In addition to monopoly power abuse,
a natural monopolist intruding into the
competitive sector raises the same problems as those which exist in the body of
regulatory law known as "dealings between affiliated enterprises." Problems
commonly arise where a regulated monopolist buys and sells, not to obtain
maximum service at optimum cost, but
in a setting of ancillary interests and
motives. PacBell's dealings from monopoly to competitive challenge sector
include the same imprudence and crosssubsidy dangers as do dealings with
affiliated enterprises (which may also be
directly involved as well). These scenarios traditionally demand cost review
and impact assessment. 65 In fact, the
most pernicious modernization abuses
involving negative utilization and competitive impact implications are likely to
be cloaked through affiliated enterprises,
making this analysis and proposal relevant to the examination of modernization projects of affiliated enterprises a
critical part of rigorous affiliated company review.
As noted above, the problems of
monopoly/ competition interaction are
not matters of first impression. In trans-

portation and in communications, analogous precedents exist which support
required review of the competitive impact outlined above. A leading case is
66
FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.

There, Justice Frankfurter reviewed
FCC policy concerning an attempt by
Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company
to compete in an area of RCA's FCCgranted franchise. The Court reversed
the Commission's allowance of competitive interaction, and thoroughly scolded
the regulator for simply assuming a
benefit from competition as a "national
policy" without a thorough, fact-based
inquiry into public interest impacts. The
Court rejected the notion that competition is automatically to be preferred, or
that regular monopoly intrusion into
67
competitive areas is to be presumed.
The Court then instructed the Commission to evaluate in detail the interaction
between monopoly68 and competition in
setting its policies.
In American Commercial Lines, Inc.
69
v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
Justice Marshall explored in detail the
kinds of cost comparisons which should
be evaluated by the Commission in determining regulatory policies. The issue
there turned on whether the railroad
should be allowed to compete against
water carriers, which are not a natural
monopoly, in the carriage of ore. Related to the issue of the monopolist's
desire to invest in modernization of the
competitive sector in order to capture
business now carried by another, the
railroad sought a reduction in rates to
allow it to compete. The first area of
detailed consideration was the "inherent
cost advantage" of the railroad's monopoly structure seeking entry into the
business area of the barges. Justice Marshall discussed the ICC's computation
of both modes' fully distributed and
out-of-pocket costs per ton, 70 and then
the history and meaning of the term
"inherent advantage."
The entire context of the American
Commercial Lines decision-and, indeed, the entire body of law in this
area-is the fundamental examination
of basic out-of-pocket and fully distributed costs of the monopolist and
those with whom the monopolist might
compete. 7' Yet the behavior of the nation's LECs to date voids this critical
line of inquiry which has been mandated
by the courts on regulators. Adoption
of the suggested EIS would ensure that
the considerations repeatedly demanded
by the courts remain part of the competitive investment calculation.
Perhaps the most telling language
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supporting the proposed EIS can be
found in United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc. 72 There, the trial court,
having reviewed an elaborate evidentiary
record of telephone utility abuse, was
confronted with requests for "waivers"
by regional holding companies for competitive sector entry-otherwise limited
by a then-outstanding court order. The

priate and significant ingredient
in any decision under section
VIII(C).
*There is no formula for allocating common costs among services, and, even if there were, the
fact is that the Regional Holding
Companies alone possess all the
relevant cost information and have
a great deal of discretion in the
treatment of such costs.
**The crux of the government's case against AT&T was
that regulation had failed to safeguard competition from a powerful firm, engaged in both regulated
monopoly and unregulated services, which had the incentive and
the ability to use its regulated
monopoly to impede competition73
in potentially competitive markets.

court refused to grant any such waivers,
and issued scathing remarks about the
history of regulatory review of holding
company operations in the competitive
sector:
In response to these concerns,
the Regional Holding Companies
argue primarily that cross subsidi-

zation is not a competitive issue
but a regulatory cost allocation
matter for which regulatory sanctions and penalties already exist.
In addition, they contend that,
even if they did engage in such
anticompetitive conduct, the appropriate remedy would be a new
antitrust action, not a refusal to

The court concluded that the Holding
Companies should carry the burden in
showing competitive impact before
granting any waiver. 74 Once a sunk-cost
investment has been made, its unwinding
may prove difficult even where "imprudent investment" is later adjudicated.
PacBell and other LECs have a propensity to raise arguments about the illegali75
ty of "retroactive ratemaking."'
However, penalties or disallowances as
to prospective operations are-in most
cases-unlikely to compensate ratepayers
fully for the improvident use of ratepayer revenues or ratepayer financed investment monies.

grant a waiver. [footnote omitted]
These arguments are entirely without merit.
The cross subsidization of
competitive activities with profits
earned from a regulated enterprise
constitutes precisely the kind of
conduct the decree was intended
to curb, and for which the decree
contains.. .a very precise remedy.
There is therefore no reason or
basis for turning elsewhere when
such practices are threatened by
organizations subject to the provisions of the decree.
That remedy, moreover, is pref-

erable to a regulatory one. Cost
misallocations and improper transfer pricing in interaffiliate sales
have proved difficult, if not impossible, to detect.* It is for that
reason that regulatory oversight
has not been in the past,** nor is
it likely to be in the future, an
adequate check against them; it is
for that reason that section VIII(C)
was incorporated in the decree;
and it is for that reason, too, that
the burden was placed on the Operating Companies to demonstrate
the absence of an anticompetitive

effect. By contrast, in a new antitrust action or in a regulatory proceeding the proponent of a restriction would have the burden of
proof. In short, the prevention of
cross subsidization and other anticompetitive practices is an appro-

PACBELL'S FAILURE TO
CONSIDER CRITICAL CRITERIA:
THE RECORD

PacBell has argued throughout its
1985-88 rate review proceedings before
the California PUC that the considerations cited above are not included because they are "unnecessary." It is
important for the regulator to know the
extent of the present void as to this
largest LEC, both for its own sake and
inferentially for the nation's other less
extensively-staffed LECs. In Application
85-01-034, CPIL presented extensive
data requests to PacBell concerning utilization and utilization-related factors. 76
For example, CPIL requested "all studies regarding utilization of fixed plant
of PacBell." 77 The response filed by
PacBell staff witness Pettit is followed
by several pages of sample data of the
information gathered by PacBell in response to this question. The first two
pages presented central office utilization
data for 1986 for approximately 100
exchanges; additional pages covered
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other exchanges for other years. PacBell
also presented a similar sample of its
OSP data. This response by Pettit to a
request for "all studies" regarding
PacBell's utilization of fixed plant yields
no utilization analysis or study whatever,
except for the central office equipment
and OSP percentage figures required
by the Commission and denigrated by
PacBell itself, and even this information
is not used in utility investment decisions.
Additional CPIL data requests asked
for all studies differentiating costs of
fixed plant between customer or customer types; all studies showing the marginal
costs of adding additional NALs by customer categories; all studies showing
how modernization costs have been or
will be allocated among customer categories; and all incremental cost studies,
such as exchange costs, dial tone costs,
and imbedded cost studies. These various requests were made in order to fully
explore possible considerations missing
from the existing record which PacBell
might employ. PacBell's responses cited
existing information in certain workpapers,78 which also lack the utilization
and competition considerations described above.
In order to further document the
way in which PacBell makes its modernization decisions, CPIL asked a series of
questions in 85-01-034.79 CPIL asked
for documents outlining planned "new
products and services" as described in
the testimony of PacBell witness Whittiker.8 0 Another request asked, as to
each new product or service initiated
after 1980 or planned for implementation during the 1980s decade, for any
documents or studies outlining investment or operating costs, and any demand
studies or other documents indicating
the actual or anticipated user group as
to each. 8 1
PacBell responded to these and other
CPIL requests by revealing its inhouse
process for new product-service approval, including PacBell internal deliberative documents for a substantial number
of the post-1980 projects. The internal
memoranda produced in 85-01-034 in
response to CPIL requests for all such
documents are starkly revealing. Unfortunately, these documents were produced
by the utility only under a protective
order barring their disclosure. Although
embarrassment (rather than trade secret
protection) is a more likely utility motivation for confidentiality as to some of
these documents, we are compelled to
respect the protective order. However,
the PUC is in possession of this material,
8 2
presented by CPIL in sealed exhibits.

0
The conclusions any observer must draw
from a review of the current PacBell
pre-approval analysis are as follows:
(1) the utility's economic analysis
ranges from crude to non-existent;
(2) The utility is focused on its business customers;
(3) The utility calculates its likely
return, if that calculation is made at all,
based on existing competitor prices (not
costs);
(4) If an investment will "keep" existing customers, it is justified, according
to PacBell;
(5) There is a willingness to invest
ratepayer monies solely to improve the
image of the utility; and
(6) There is no consideration of the
variables proffered here, including plant
capacity, economies of scale, utilization
(or, indeed, traffic impact accommodation at all), competitor costs, cross-subsidies or anticompetitive impact.
PacBell does not hide its orientation;
during recent PacBell General Rate Case
hearings, CPIL cross-examined PacBell
staff witness Bandler about "a modernization expense which is undertaken
solely because, regardless of any other
criterion, it could generate a net profit
from ...[PacBell's] customers." Bandler
responded: "I think that would be proper."s3 Bandler continued with candor:
"The prime determinant of a probable
modernization project would be the increase in net present value that one
would get from the economic analysis
one would do with that project. That, in
effect, optimizing the profitability or the
net present value is in fact the prime
criteria we would use for deciding wheth84
er to do a modernization project.
Note that the net present value calculation in PacBell's CUCRIT formula, as
noted above and as admitted by PacBell,
does not include any of the plant utilization or competitive impact elements
urged by CPIL.
PacBell believes it should use the
same criteria as those used by an unregulated business subject to competition.
The cross-examination of PacBell's witness Copeland is consistent: "The same
methodology or the same tool, the same
decisionmaking tool would be appropriate either in the franchise area or in an
area which is highly competitive with
other existing suppliers and service. "85
Certainly PacBell should use the considerations common in the competitive
sector (which it does not), but it must
then factor in (for regulatory review)
additional elements because of its natural monopoly and the problems of monopoly-competition interaction (which it
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also does not do).
The failure of PacBell to address the
two major areas of inquiry in any modernization decision-and its lack of plans
to do so-is particularly regrettable in
light of its own expert's testimony at
recent rate hearings concerning their
impact. PacBell's expert Dr. Perl testified under CPIL cross-examination that
economy of scale and utilization numbers, as well as cost data, are important
information to have in making moderni86
zation decisions.
THE PROPOSED ECONOMIC
IMPACT STATEMENT
Regulators cannot simply cut the
LECs loose to freely make investment
decisions justified by their incantation
of "competition." State regulators must
recognize that LECs are emphatically
not just another player in the telecommunications marketplace.
The public agency has a set of regulatory goals more inclusive than and different from the LEC's internal goals.
The regulator is caught between several
conflicting interests: a desire to encourage new technology, especially where
that technology may subject to competition an area of commerce previously
subject only to a single entrepreneur; a
desire to give the utility a chance to
provide the same technological services
challengers may proffer; a desire to see
those who are dependent upon monopoly services receive those services at a
reasonable cost; and a desire to make
sure that the sunk cost already committed to a particular87 monopoly enterprise
is efficiently used.
In order to prevent unfair competition or cross-subsidies, an Economic
Impact Statement (EIS) should accompany any proposed investment decision
designed to address competition 8 in
excess of $5 million, or which involves
more than $2 million in additional projected annual expense or revenue. 89
After the decision to proceed, substantial flexibility in implementation, timing,
and pricing by the utility may be appropriate. The only crucial restraints that
need be imposed on the LEC by the
regulator are those with regard to expenses and prices. First, the expenses
and costs of the investment decision
must accurately be held against the revenues from the competitive product, service, or customer category, to avoid any
cross-subsidy. Second, the price charged
the customer for the new service, or for
the service supplied to retain or attract
customers, must never be allowed to fall
below the long-run average costs of the

project. Within these rather broad constraints, however, there is a diminished
need for the regulator to intimately involve itself in the management of the
project.
It is crucial, however, that this be a
prospective decision. The regulator will
be faced with insuperable problems in
trying to assess and allocate financial
data after the fact. If segregation is desirable from a regulatory viewpoint, it
must occur before the investment is
made. Moreover, as the cases discussed
above make clear, the regulator has an
affirmative duty to oversee the competitive impacts before the actions are undertaken. Post hoc decisionmaking will
not suffice under a general rubric of
fostering competition. For the LEC, the
advantage of careful scrutiny before the
investment may be balanced by relaxed
regulation in the implementation.
CPIL recommends a required EIS
which includes three elements. We note
that precise data and minimal required
information in each category may be
subject to further refinement. But the
basic elements suggested for initial inclusion in the EIS are currently within
the capability of the LECs.
Financial Impact. The first of the
three elements is an analysis of the projected revenue stream and return on
investment impact. PacBell currently
performs this through its CUCRIT computer formula which calculates the net
present value of an investment and limited alternatives. Although the Ratepayer Advocate Division of the PUC
has many concerns about the proper
usage of PacBell's computer formula, a
properly devised model and analysis may
show direct cost savings from an investment decision under current traffic and
equipment conditions so as to justify
approval without proceeding further. If
such a showing can be made, the two
remaining steps of the Economic Impact
Statement may be waived.
However, where an LEC makes a
large-scale investment decision (certainly involving more than $5 million in
total investment or anticipated annual
revenues or expenses in excess of $2
million in total), where that decision
may affect traffic, and where it involves
a competitive interaction with a nonutility service or product, EIS steps Two
and Three, respectively, should be undertaken. The Economic Impact Statement
should be submitted in advance to the
regulator's staff for review, to intervenors and affected competitors for comment (albeit in summary form to respect
any relevant trade secrets of the utility),
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and finally to the regulator for at least
summary consideration.
Utilization. The second element is
utilization, as discussed in detail above.
In the EIS, this factor measures the
impact of the proposed product, service,
or investment on utilization levels of
both added and existing physical plant.
The LEC should be required to provide
the following information relevant to
utilization levels: (1) the projected utilization of the added plant required for
the proposed product, service, or investment over its life; (2) the impact of the
product, service, or investment on the
increased or decreased utilization of existing fixed plant facilities already in
place as a sunk cost; and (3) the calculated total average cost reduction (if
any) attributable to any such increase in
utilization. This analysis requires utilization and economy of scale measurement
of the LEC plant as a whole, and for the
particular portions of the LEC plant
which would be operationally affected
by a given product, service, or investment modernization decision.
Competitive Impact. The third element-competitive impact-would analyze the relationship between the
proposed new product, service, or investment and similar services or alternatives
which may be offered by others. 90 This
element requires an analysis of the following: (1) whether the proposed product, service, or investment must be or is
inextricably connected to the monopoly
power loop of the LEC, and if so, how
and to what extent (i.e., is it something
only the LEC can offer or is it amenable
to competitive offering); (2) the extent
to which outside nonmonopoly competitors are capable of providing that product or service; (3) the comparative cost
characteristics of providing that product,
service, or investment from the LEC
resources as opposed to the competitive
sector; (4) the cost advantages of LEC
assumption of that new product or service against outside alternatives; (5) the
current incidence (or announced plans)
of entrepreneurs in the competitive sector to provide the proposed product or
service; (6) the restrictions or guidelines
on the purchase or use of the items or
services vis-a-vis their marketing by competitors; and (7) the extent to which a
cross-subsidy may occur from monopoly
power loop sectors within the LEC structure to carry the operations proposed.
As to this last subject of analysis, a
cross-subsidy analysis would include the
extent to which the new product or
service will be carried on a marginal
cost basis without contribution to the
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LEC's existing overhead.
CONCLUSION
The proposals put forth here are
based on the need for full and accurate
information from the LECs as they increasingly unlimber their competitive
muscles.
The stunning lack of basic information about the LECs' economies of scale
and utilization levels affected by competitive investment should give LEC regulators pause before unleashing them.
Further, the unwillingness or inability
of the LECs to behave as true entrepreneurs in assessing their competitive positions suggests they are less ready for
the competitive forces than their professions of eagerness would indicate. The
regulator necessarily has a set of goals
which are far broader and more complex
than are the LECs' internal concerns.
The anticompetitive potential of the
LECs' involvement in nonmonopoly interactions requires, under well-established precedent, careful, thorough, and
prospective oversight by the regulator.
Flexibility may be a desirable regulatory
mode, but it cannot fulfill the regulator's
other public goals unless that flexibility
is preceded by an assurance that cost or
efficiency advantages exist, and that
anticompetitive impacts have been
minimized.
On October 2, 1986, PacBell issued a
press release announcing Memoranda of
Understanding with two companies to
jointly develop an advanced telecommunications network system. The press
release and ensuing news articles announced that it was a move which "could
lay the foundation for hundreds of new
91
customer services."1
The reporters covering the story
noted that "PacBell officials would not
discuss the financial aspects of the
memo, the cost of...[PacBell's investment], and would give only limited examples of services the planned software
92
would provide."
The signing of memoranda of understanding with two firms, legally committing PacBell to a long-term relationship for the provision of new products
and services as a part of a long-range
modernization program, was not revealed to the California PUC prior to
its formal public announcement, or prior
to its entry in final legally binding form.
PacBell's failure to inform the regulator
about imminent plans in this area was
particularly unfortunate, given the fact
that the announcement occurred after
almost one year of proceedings on the
very subject relevant to those commit-
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ments: the modernization policies of
PacBell-which hearings were in progress while the discussions were held and
decisions were made.
The bad faith of the utility is accentuated by the fact that it had before it, for
a full four months prior to this announcement, a data request from CPIL
for information which would have compelled the disclosure of these plans and
respective commitments. 93 Its responses
omitted their mention.
Pacific Telesis, the parent of PacBell,
continues to engage in substantial public
relations advertising which it may erroneously believe PacBell ratepayers will
finance. But whoever pays for it,
PacBell's imprimatur is placed on the
ads running in the mass media throughout California seeking to associate the
management of these related companies
with the courage and skill which brought
the world major human advancements
deserving of admiration through the millenia. One ad purports to equate the
modus operandi of Pacific Telesis management with the skill involved in early
weather satellite prognosis, which, it is
announced in stentorian tones, has saved
thousands of lives in the tracking of
hurricanes. Another ad associates the
logo and name of PacBell's parent with
the miracle of the Golden Gate Bridge,
featuring stoic workmen stringing massive cable in the sky. The most recent
advertisement attempts to associate management philosophy with the foresightedness which created the Suez Canal. In
each case, the definition of "telesis" is
paraded forth: "intelligent planning."
It is not intelligent planning to enter
into binding legal commitments without
developing the most elementary criteria
for prudent modernization investment.
It is not intelligent planning to ignore
the ways in which the basic economic
structure of your own capital plant may
be affected by those decisions. It is not
intelligent planning to fail to calculate
traffic impacts and utilization levels as
they may affect average costs for the
system as a whole. It is not intelligent
planning not to investigate, and at least
estimate from available information, the
cost structure of competitors. And it is
not intelligent planning to be unaware
of the cross-subsidy impacts on existing
services and customers of planned investments totaling billions of dollars.
If the regulators of PacBell and other
LECs wish to assure "intelligent planning," they will have to provide it-or
require it-themselves. They can do so
most assuredly by obtaining the information, in advance, relevant to their public
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responsibilities as regulators: information about monopoly sunk plant utilization and cost impacts, and information
about competitive impact. An Economic
Impact Statement is a formalized procedure which will ensure routine consideration of basic factors now missing from
these momentous long-term decisions.

FOOTNOTES
1. A "natural monopoly" is typically
described by economists as occurring
where "the long-run unit cost function
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at 520 (1970).
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3. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944).
4. See, e.g., ICC v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford Railroad, 372 U.S.
744 (1963); see also American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad, 392 U.S. 571 (1968). For a
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1970).
5. Regarding affiliated enterprise transaction, see Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); In Re
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 53
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FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,
346 U.S. 86 (1953); Hawaiian Telephone
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level. Fragmented local government agencies-with their own proprietary interests in the collection of "franchise
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8. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, -U.S.-.,
106
S.Ct. 2034 (1986).
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check" grant of monopoly cable franchises by a state to local governments,
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openly suggested has not been assiduous.
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Utilities Commission (PUC), En Banc
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15. PUC Application 87-11-033.
16. PUC Application 85-01-34, Exhibit 530 at 5. All further references to
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